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NOTES
Constitutional Law
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

IN

FEDERAL

COURTS:

PROBLEM OF COMMUNIST AFFILIATION

Against a background of hate and hysteria in a world where individual freedom is daily becoming more constrained, the liberties protected by the Constitution of the United States stand out sharply defined. In the courts of this nation, even those who would destroy the
fabric of freedom claim the protection which that document gives to
all citizens. Among the safeguards which the individual can rightly
aver, in the course of proceedings against him, are those assured by the
Fifth Amendment. 1
This article is limited to one of those safeguards-that of the privilege against self-incrimination. This privilege did not originate in the
1 "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself...." U. S. CONST. AMEND. V.
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Constitution, but as a heritage of the common law was incorporated
in it as the law of the land.2 The privilege here under discussion is
that guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and restricted only to the
Federal Government.
The common law origin of the privilege is shrouded in confusion.
The exact time of its early recognition is not known although it is
generally believed that it began to take root in the Thirteenth Century
in the form of resistance to taking the oath ex officio of the ecclesiastical courts.3 Some authorities trace the origins into the Roman
Law; 4 according to other sources, it has its beginning in a higher law. 5
The common law expressed the privilege in the maxim nemo tenetur
prodere seipsum-nobody is bound to accuse himself. The first recorded use of the phrase was by Sir Edward Coke in Cullier v. Cullier.6
7
Corwin comments that it may have originated with Coke.
In the early English law there was uncertainty as to whether the
privilege applied to the accused or to witnesses. In Lilburn's Case,8
where a witness refused to testify because his testimony might incriminate, the witness admitted that if he himself had been accused,
he would have had to testify. The privilege was not allowed and the
witness, Lilburn, was whipped for his refusal. The House of Commons later voted the sentence illegal and on petition, the House of
Lords ordered the sentence vacated as "illegal and most unjust . ..
and against.

. .

the law of the land. . .

."

This finally confirmed the

law to be that no witness could be compelled to give testimony of an
incriminating nature. It was from this interpretation that the privilege
was adopted by the Fifth Amendment and by its language extended,
not restricted, to the accused in a criminal case.9
I.
The constitutional privilege merely reiterates the common law against
self-incrimination. If literally interpreted, it would apply only to the
defendant in a criminal case; but having been construed in the light
of the common law precedents, it is not limited to the criminally
2
3

8 WIO oRE, EvIDENcE § 2252 nn. 4,5 (3rd ed. 1940).
8 Id. § 2250; Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-

r--iamination Clause, 29 Mica. L. R, .1 (1930).
4 R BERTI, DE PRocEssiaus, cited by Corwin, supra note 3, at 7 n.
5 Lilburn's Trial, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315, 1331 (1637). In refusing to take
the oath ex officio, Lilburn said: ". . . it is absolutely against the law of God;
for that law requires no man to accuse ,himself .... This oath is against the
very law of nature." As cited by Corwin, supra note 3, at 7.
6 Cro. EIiz. 201, 78 Eng. Rep. 457 (1589).
7 Corwin, op. cit. supra note 3, at 7.
8 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1637), as cited by Corwin, supra note 3, at 7.
9 8 Wio oRE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2252 nn. 6,7.
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accused alone. 10 Consequently, it has been deemed applicable to civil
cases where the question asked might have incriminated the witness or
accused.." The crux of the entire matter is the interpretation of "incriminate" or "expose to criminal prosecution." This has been held to
mean that in any instance where the answer would expose the witness
to fine, imprisonment, forfeiture, or penalty, whether in a civil or
criminal proceeding, the witness will be excused from answering the
question.12

It is elemental that a person accused may not take the witness
stand in a criminal trial and still claim the constitutional privilege.
His right is to refuse to testify; by taking the stand, he waives this
immunity. Otherwise the anamolous situation would arise where a defendant could take the stand to give favorable evidence for his case
and then by claiming the privilege, bar the prosecution from attacking
his credibility in cross-examination. Under such circumstances the
privilege would be one against giving evidence which would tend to
convict. It is true that as the law now stands, and as it stood at the
time of the adoption of the amendment, the accused may refuse to
testify in his own trial. The amendment unequivocally gives him this
right. But the privilege is broader than this. It applies, not only to
the defendant in a criminal case, but also to a witness.' 3 And as
stated above, it is not confined to criminal cases.
It is readily evident that questions may be put to a witness in other
tribunals, the answers to which would expose him to prosecution for
a crime. It is a reasonable rule that he should not be compelled to
answer them, for then the privilege would have no significance. This
is the position the Supreme Court has taken.' 4 A witness is protected
against self-incrimination wherever he is called upon to answer questions, and where he can be compelled to testify.
Nor is the privilege limited to cases before the courts. It extends
to witnesses summoned before grand juries, legislative investigating
committees, and administrative tribunals. It is, as the United States
Supreme Court has pointed out, as broad as the mischief against which
it protects. 15
A grand jury, in order to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant a true bill, has the authority to summon witnesses
10
11

Ibid.

McCarthy v. Arndstein, 226 U. S. 34, 45 S. Ct. 16, 69 L. Ed. 158 (1924).
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886);
Coffey v. United States, 116 U. S. 436, 6 S. Ct. 437, 29 L. Ed. 684 (1886).
12

13

United States v. Burr (In re Willie), 25 Fed. Cas. 38, No. 14,692e (C. C.

D. Va. 1807).

14 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 12 S. Ct. 195, 35 L. Ed. 1110
(1892).
15 Id. at 563.
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before it, and to compel their testimony. A person ordered to appear
and answer is not stripped of his constitutional rights merely because
the constitutional amendment refers only to criminal cases. Here also,
one has a right to refuse to testify if such testimony would expose him
to prosecution for crime. In fact, many of the decisions concerning
the privilege arise out of grand jury investigations where a contumacious witness is cited for contempt of court because he refused to answer
a question put to him. 16
It has long been established that the legislature may inquire into
various activities in the course of preparing legislation. 17 Concomitant
with this power of inquiry for legislative purposes is the power to
summon witnesses and to compel their testimony before the legislature
or its committees.' 8 While it has definitely been established under
state law and constitution that witnesses before state legislative committees have the option of claiming the privilege of self-incrimination, 19 there have not been any direct determinations whether it can
be claimed before a Congressional committee.
The Counselman v. Hitchcock case,20 through dicta, viewed favorably the extension of the privilege before legislative committees. The
reasons given were based upon the privilege as enunciated in state proceedings. The crucial question involved seems to resolve itself around
the scope of a criminal case as the phrase appears in the Fifth Amendment. If the restricted, literal view of the words "criminal case" is
adhered to, the privilege would not be allowed. But if the broad interpretation of the common law is to be logically followed, the privilege
which extends to civil cases and grand jury investigations, should also
extend to testimony before a congressional committee. The United
States Supreme Court has assumed this to be true,21 but has not, as
yet decided this precise issue. In many decisions, the Court has volunteered the opinion that the privilege would be broad enough to sustain
a refusal to testify if incrimination would result, no matter where the
16 See note 14 supra; Mason v. United States, 244 U. S.362, 37 S. Ct. 621,
61 L. Ed. 1198 (1917); Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S.591, 16 S. Ct. 644, 40
L. Ed. 819 (1896); United States v. Cusson, 132 F. (2d) 413 (2d Cir. 1942).
17 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S.135, 47 S.Ct. 319, 71 L. Ed. 580 (1927).
18 Ibid.; Barsky v. United States, 167 F. (2d) 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 334 U. S.843, 68 S.Ct. 1511, 92 L. Ed. 1767 (1948).
19 Henry Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172 (1871); Doyle v. Hofstader et al.,
257 N. Y. 244, 177 N. E. 489 (1931); In re Hearing Before Joint Legislative
Committee, 137 S.C. 1, 196 S.E. 164 (1938).
20 142 U. S. 547* 563, 12 S.Ct. 195, 35 L. Ed. 1110 (1892), while stating
the object of the amendment, the Court said: ". . . a person should not be
compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony
which might tend to show that he himself had committed a crime." (Emphasis
supplied.)
21

Ibid.
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testimony is being elicited. 22 Naturally, before the privilege attaches,
the testimony of the witness must be through compulsion. Thus in
May v. United States,2 3 where the witness voluntarily testified, the
absence of compulsion made the- evidence given admissable in his subsequent trial.
The privilege of refusing to answer is based upon the right of the
witness not to accuse himself of crime. If the answer does not incriminate the witness, or if the consequences of the incrimination are
removed, the privilege no longer exists, and he must answer. The
method by which testimony can thus be compelled is by statutes grant25
ing immunity 24 to the witness.
The first attempt by Congress to provide immunity was held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court because the im26
munity was not as broad as the privilege it attempted to replace.
In order that any immunity statute be held valid, it must meet this
requirement: it must be coextensive with the privilege. 27 It is questioned whether the present immunity statute 28 gives the witness absolute immunity.29 If the courts deem the statute as inadequate, then
the privilege may still be claimed, and the statute making refusal to
testify a misdemeanor would not apply. 30 The fact that immunity
given by federal law is no bar to prosecution in state courts does not
render the statute inadequate or allow the witness to claim the privi31
lege.
II.

A basic problem in the field of self-incrimination is: who determines
the incriminatory character of the question. Both in England and
the United States, there existed a hesitancy in attempting to formulate
a test for this problem. 32 The early English view seemed to be based
22 Ibid.; United States v. Goodner et al., 35 F. Supp. 286 (D. Colo. 1940).
23 175 F. (2d) 994 (D. C. Cir. 1949).
24 8 Wic oRE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2281: "...
'Immunity' signifies the
beneficial result to the offender . . . the non-liability for the offense itself...
By an immunity the offender's guilt ceases.. .. "
25 See note 14 supra; Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372, 26 S. Ct. 73, 50 L. Ed.
234 (1905); Brown v. Walker, supra note 16.
26 See note 14 supra.
27 Id., 142 U. S. at 586.
28 18 U. S. C. § 3486 (1948): "No testimony given by a witness before
either House . . . shall be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding against
him in any court. .. ."
29 Hamilton, The InquisitorialPower of Congress, 23 A. B. A. J. 511 (1937).
30 52 STAT. 942 (1938), 2 U. S. C. § 192 (1946): "Every person who having
been summoned as a witness by . . . either House . . . who . . . refuses to answer
... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor."
31 United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, 52 S. Ct. 63, 76 L. Ed. 210
(1931).
32 8 WioRE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2271 n. 3.
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on the proposition that the witness alone knew all the circumstances
and how the question, if answered, would be connected with other facts
to establish his guilt. This therefore led to the once prevalent statement that the witness's claim of the privilege was conclusive. 33 From
this position, the courts gradually retreated, the English much slower
than the American. They finally adopted the rule that the statement
of the witness, standing alone, was not enough; he must show the court
his danger. 34 Because of the fact that the English courts were unsettled
so long on this problem, many early American state cases held that
the application of the privilege must be at the determination of the
witness.3 5
The federal courts have, since United States v. Burr (In re Willie),36
followed the view that the judge ultimately must determine whether or
not the question propounded will incriminate. In that case, Burr's
secretary was questioned concerning a certain letter written in cipher,
and refused to answer on the grounds that he might provide clues that
would show himself guilty of a crime (misprision of treason). The
court ordered him to answer, determining that the question related only
to a knowledge of the cipher and not to the contents, and was therefore
not incriminating. In its determination of the propriety of the question, the court considered the two opposing principles which create the
problem, one being the right of the United States to compel testimony;
the other being the privilege of the witness not to accuse himself of
crime. Courts must weigh both these principles, and the burden falls
upon the witness to show the criminatory character of the testimony.
Chief Justice Marshall, in the Burr case, said the court must determine whether the question might incriminate, and if it would, the witness must then decide whether the answer would incriminate. If he
swears that it would, the court is bound by his oath, and cannot re37
quire an answer. In Marshall's own words:
When a question is propounded, it belongs to the court to consider
and to decide whether any direct answer to it can implicate the witness.
If this be decided in the negative, then he may answer it without violating the privilege which is secured to him by law. If a direct answer
to it may criminate himself, then he must be the sole judge what his
answer would be. The court cannot participate with him in this judgment, because they cannot decide on the effect of his answer without
knowing what it would be; and a disclosure of that fact to the judges
33 Adams v. Lloyd, 3 H. & N. 351, 157 Eng. Rep. 506 (1858); Fisher v. Ronalds, 12 C. B. 762, 138 Eng. Rep. 1104 (1852).
34 Mason v. United States, supra note 16; United States v. Burr (In re
Willie), supra, note 13.
35 Word v. Sykes, 61 Miss. 649 (1884); Warner v. Lucas, 10 Ohio 337 (1840);
Poole v. Perritt, 28 S. C. 128 (1842); State v. Edwards, 2 Nott. & M. 13 (S.
Car. 1819).
36 See note 13 supra.
37 Id., 25 Fed. Cas. at 40.
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would strip him of the privilege which the law allows, and which he
claims. It follows . . . necessarily then, from this statement of things,
that if the question be of such a description that an answer to it may
or may may not criminate the witness, according to the purport of that
answer, it must rest with himself, who alone can tell what it would be,
to answer the question or not. If, in such a case, he say upon his oath
that his answer would criminate himself, the court can demand no other
testimony of the fact.

III.

Another basic problem is: what is an incriminating question? The
solution appears simple: one to which the answer would expose the
witness to prosecution for crime. However, the effect of an answer
varies from one which would brand the witness guilty of an offense
to one which has no evidentiary value at all, such as where the danger
apprehended by the witness is unreasonable'or a product of a worried
conscience. Out of many cases on this particular point, the writers on
the subject have synthesized three different types of questions which
might, if answered, incriminate. 38 The first is the question which
would directly incriminate. No court, where the privilege has been
recognized, ever required an answer to this kind of inquiry. The second
type is the question to which an answer, while not directly admitting
a crime, would reveal a material element of an offense. This, too, has
come under the interdiction of the courts. The third category of incriminating questions can best be described as "clue-supplying." These
are questions which are not incriminating in themselves, but if answered
would supply a lead to material elements.
The courts are historically divided on whether the third type of
question must be answered. The early cases follow Chief Justice Marshall, who decided that a witness can be compelled to answer only if
the answer is not directly incriminating or does not constitute a necessary and material link in the chain of evidence. 39 In the Burr case,
the witness was required to answer a question which could supply
a clue.
4
The modern view was first laid down in Counselman v. Hitchcock. 0
In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that an immunity
statute could not replace the privilege against self-incrimination if the
38 8 WiGmoPE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2260 et seq.; Godlewski, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination Before the House Committee on Un-American Activities,
1 INTRA. L. REv. (St. Louis U.) 15, 17 (1949); Rapacz, Rules Governing the
Allowance of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 19 bxN. L. Rnv. 426
(1935).
39 United States v. Quitman, 27 Fed. Cas. 680, No. 16,111 (C. C. E. D. La.
1854); United States v. Moses, 27 Fed. Cas. 5, No. 15,824 (C. C. D. C. 1804);
United States v. Burr (In re Willie), supra note 13; MoDEL CoDE or EviDNwcF,
Rule 202 and comment (1942).
40 See note 14 supra.
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statute did not prohibit the use of testimony or evidence obtained as
a result of a lead supplied by the testimony. The logical corollary of
this holding is that the witness may refuse to answer any question
which seeks to elicit information, even if the answer itself does not
incriminate, but which only leads to incriminating evidence.
Wigmore 4 1 has criticized the courts for extending the privilege to
the third type of question. The purpose of the privilege is not to prevent the giving of facts which might, in the hands of a "skillful and
ingenious prosecutor" lead to the uncovering of material elements;
but rather, to enable the witness to avoid giving those material elements himself in his own testimony. As Marshall in In re Willie,4424
43
Frank in his dissent to United States v. St. Pierre, and Wigmore
indicate, the dividing line between the two types of questions is obscure
but existant. There is a definite point where the testimony desired
would not reveal a link in the chain of evidence; and once that point
is passed, the privilege no longer applies. Although careful and meticulous investigation of a lead supplied by the witness might uncover
a material and necessary fact which would enable the prosecutor to
secure a conviction, the witness is not incriminating himself by his
testimony and it does not contravene the amendment to require him
to answer. As pointed out in May v. United States, 45 the purpose of
the privilege is not to enable the witness or accused to escape punishment for his misdeeds, but only to force the state to use evidence other
than that supplied by the witness to secure conviction.
While this view is perhaps the most logical and probably represents
the intentions of the framers of the amendment, 4 6 it is not. followed
by the federal courts today. The present position is best outlined by
47
Judge Hand in the St. Pierrecase when he says:
Whatever may have been the original limits of the privilege .

.

. since

Counselman v. Hitchcock, it is settled in federal courts that a witness
cannot be compelled to disclose anything that will "tend" to incriminate
him, whether or not the answer would be an admission of one of the
constitutive elements of the crime.

We see, then, that the test initiated by Marshall no longer applies,
and the witness cannot be compelled to give either a material element
or a lead to a material element. So all the three types of questions
are proscribed in the federal courts.
41
42

8 WcmoxRE, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 2261 et seq.
See note 13 supra.

43

132 F. (2d) 837 (2d Cir. 1942).
8 WIGmoRa, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 2261 et seq.
See note 23 supra.
Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra note 14; United States v. Burr (In re
supra note 13.

44
45
40
Willie),
47

132 F. (2d) 837, 838 (2d Cir. 1942).
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In order to take advantage of the ban on "clue-seeking" questions,
the witness must establish to the satisfaction of the court that there is
a danger, even though the question appears harmless, 48 and that the
facts and circumstances in which the witness is enmeshed make his
answers incriminatory where otherwise they would not be. Obviously
the witness cannot fully explain the circumstances in order to claim the
right to keep silent, because to do so would reveal what he seeks to
hide; but he must show the court that there is a real danger in answering the particular, and on its face harmless, question. Possibly the best
statement of this proposition is in Regina v. Boyes, where the court
said: 49
To entitle him [a party called as a witness] . . to the privilege of
silence, the Court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the
nature of the evidence which he is called to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer. Moreover, the danger to be apprehended must be real
and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the
ordinary course of things-not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely
possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer
it to influence his conduct. . . . if the fact of witness being in danger
be once made to appear, great latitude should be allowed to him in judging for himself of the effect of any particular question.

The courts readily agree that there is no general test which can be
laid down in order to determine this proposition. As was said in Mason
v. United States,50 the determination of the incriminatory character
of the question must be with the circumstances and the exigencies of
the individual case. However, several tests have been propounded.
One is the so-called "impossibility test." The first concrete statement
of this is found in Arndstein v. United States, in which the court
stated:51
It is impossible to say from mere consideration of the questions propounded, in the light of the circumstances disclosed, that they could
have been answered with entire impunity.

This is cited with approval in Alexander v. United States.52 The problem is clear: How is a court going to know when a question might
tend to incriminate if answered?
Another test the courts have adopted in attempting to solve this
problem is the reasonable apprehension test.53 If the witness can dem187 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
48 United States v. Rosen, 174 F. (2d)
338 U. S. 851, 70 S. Ct. 87, ._ L. Ed .... (1940); United States v. Weisman,
111 F. (2d) 260 (2d Cir. 1940); United States v. Zwillman, 108 F. (2d) 802

(2d Cir. 1940) ; United States v. Burr (In re Willie), supra note 13.
49
50

1 B. & S. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (1861).
244 U. S. 362,37 S. Ct. 621, 61 L. Ed. 1198 (1917).

51

254 U. S. 71, 72, 41 S. Ct. 26, 65 L. Ed. 138 (1920).

52 181 F. (2d) 480 (9th Cir. 1950).
53 Mason v. United States, supra note 16; Camarota v. United States, 111
F. (2d) 243 (3rd Cir. 1940).
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onstrate to the satisfaction of the court that he has reasonable grounds
for believing that the question might incriminate or lead to incriminating evidence, he need not answer. In endeavoring to determine what
a reasonable apprehension is, the court in the Boyes case laid down
the general rule quoted above. The Mason case leaves the particular
determination up to the trial judge's sound discretion. The United
States Courts of Appeals for the Second 54 and Ninth 55 Circuits,
have held that an apprehension formed by reading newspaper reports
of investigations constitutes a reasonable apprehension, and reversed
the lower courts. All these cases affirm the principle that the witness
must show, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable apprehension
that the answer to the question will tend to incriminate even though
the question is harmless on its face.
In an article in the Minnesota Law Review, Professor Rapacz dis56
cusses the difficulty in applying this test, observing:
It is necessary to distinguish between a showing that the question may
incriminate and a showing of how it may do so. The court cannot
require the witness to show how an answer might incriminate him, but
it may require a showing to its satisfaction that the question, if answered, may tend to incriminate. The mere assertion of the witness that
an answer may incriminate will not suffice.

Professor Rapacz recognizes the logical distinction between how
an answer incriminates, and the fact that it may; but it is a logical
distinction only. It is difficult to see the practical difference, because
a witness, to show that it may incriminate, must show how it may.
In the words of Judge Learned Hand, 57 the witness is "boxed in a
paradox." He must "prove the criminatory character of what it is his
privilege to suppress just because it is criminatory." Judge Hand
feels that we must be "content with the door's being set a little
ajar.... "

IV.
A witness need not answer a question if that answer would incriminate directly. He need not answer if his reply discloses a material
element of a crime. He is even protected in federal courts from giving
clues which would lead to the discovery of material elements. In
increasing number in recent months, the question: "Are you or have
you been a member of the Communist Party?" has been met by a refusal on the part of witnesses to answer on the grounds that the answer
might incriminate. This position is sound only if the answer actually
United States v. Weisman, supra note 48.
Kasinowitz v. United States, 181 F. (2d) 632 (9th Cir. 1950); Doran v.
United States, 181 F. (2d) 489 (9th Cir. 1950); Alexander v. United States,
supra note 52.
54
55

56
57

Rapacz, supra note 38 at 434.
United States v. Weisman, supra note 48.
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would incriminate. A brief examination of the status of the Communist Party in the United States is in order.
The Communist Party per se has not been outlawed by the United
States. 5s On the other hand, conspiracy to overthrow the government
of the United States by force and violence contravenes the criminal
statutes of the United States. 59 The Communist Party sometimes has
been characterized as an organization seeking to overthrow the govern60
ment of the United States by force and violence.
The question now arises: If a person is asked whether or not he
is a communist, is the answer a necessary and essential link which
may convict him of a conspiracy under the Smith Act,61 or is it merely
a clue which may lead to material facts and show him guilty under
the same act? Or is it an innocent question? Under the Smith Act,
and in the light of the Schneiderman 62 and other cases, 63 the question, "Are you a Communist Party member?" would fall under the
clue-seeking type of question. This can be asserted in the light of
the language of the act and of the cases, because nowhere is the party
expressly outlawed. What the cases do is outline the circumstances
whereby the question of party membership, legally innocent in itself,
becomes a clue, or even a link, in the chain of incriminating evidence
so that a witness is justified in invoking the privilege.
In the case of Rogers v. United States, 64 a federal grand jury was
investigating various government employees who allegedly had made
false statements in connection with their loyalty oath. One witness,
who was not shown to be or to have been a government employee, and
who had not testified as to any association with the Communist Party
could not be required to answer the question as to party organization
because party membership was an element showing that an offense had
been committed. There, the circumstances under which the question
was asked and the facts of the particular case made the question incriminating, and justified the witness in declining to answer.
In recent loyalty investigations before a grand jury, the questions:
"Do you know the name of the county officers of the Los Angeles
County Communist Party?" and "Do you know the table of organiza58 Estes v. Potter, United States Attorney, et al., 183 F. (2d) 865 (5th Cir.
1950); Rogers v. United States, 180 F. (2d) 103 (10th Cir. 1950); Notes, 24
Noma-R DAmE LAW. 542 (1949); 23 NoTRE DAms LAw. 577 (1948).
59 18 U. S. C. §§ 371, 2385 (1948).

60

United States v. Dennis et al., 183 F. (2d) 201 (2d Cir. 1950); Rogers

v. United States, supra note 58.
61

18 U. S. C. § 2385 (1948), teaching and advocating the overthrow of the

government of the United States by force and violence.
62

Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L. Ed.

1796 (1943).
68 See note 55 supra.
64 179 F. (2d) 559 (10th Cir. 1950).

NOTES
tion and the duties of the county officers of the Los Angeles County
Communist Party?" were held to be incriminatory.6 5 The Circuit
Court of Appeals reasoned that in order to answer these questions, the
witnesses would have to be intimately associated with the group under
investigation, and in the light of the Smith Act and newspaper accounts
of the party as an organization advocating forcible overthrow of the
government, they were justified in refusing to answer and thus furnishing leads to their own prosecution.
The question of whether the witness knew that an alien in a deportation proceeding was a communist was disallowed in Estes v. Potter.
06
The court there said:
If the answers to the questions might tend to show that the appellant
was a member of or affiliated with the Communist Party, his fear of
criminal prosecution was justified. There is no statute that makes it
a crime to be a member of the Communist Party, but the very object
of the investigation to which the appellant was subpoenaed was to
ascertain whether the aliens in question were members of or affiliated
with the Communist Party and, therefore, subject to deportation under
8 U. S. C. A. § 137, subdivision (e) and (g) of which provide for the
deportation of any aliens who are members of or affiliated with any organization, association, society, or group, that believes in, advises, advocates, or teaches, the overthrow by force or violence of the government
of the United States....
Appellant was asked whether he personally knew the alien; if he
knew whether said alien was a member of the Communist Party; .. .if
he know whether the alien attended meetings of the Communist Party,
etc. He could hardly know whether the alien attended meetings without
being present there in person, and evidence of appellant attending such
meetings would tend to show that he was a Communist. Appellant was
not asked concerning things that he might have heard or been told.
he was not asked if he knew the alien's reputation for communistic
activities. The distinction is a significant one. He could not know the
crucial things that he was asked about without furnishing a link in the
chain of evidence that might be needed to convict him under the New
Criminal Code, 18 U. S. C. A. § 2385 or 18 U. S. C. A. § 371....
The questions propounded to the appellant do not disclose the incriminatory nature of the answers sought to be elicited, but appellant
does not have to prove that his answer would incriminate him to be
entitled to the privilege. If that were the nature of the burden, he
would be forced to divulge the very facts that the immunity permits him
to suppress. A witness need only show that his answers are likely to be
dangerous to him. If in the circumstances it is reasonable to infer the
possibility of incrimination from the answers that the witness may give,
the privilege may be claimed.

There is some question as to whether the Communist Party is implicitly outlawed. As a result of the trial of the eleven communist
leaders before Judge Medina in New York, 67 there are additional
65
66
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See note 55 spra.
183 F. (2d) 865, 867 (5th Cir. 1950).
Godlewski, supra note 38, at 20.
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grounds for believing that the question may be of an incriminating
nature. The reason is not that it is unlawful to be a party member,
but because it is unlawful to engage in a conspiracy. The tendency,
as a result of the trial, is to treat the Communist Party as a conspiracy. The position, then, becomes this: while the answer is not
directly incriminating-that is, the answer "yes" to the question proposed would not of itself lead to criminal prosecution, it might in the
hands of a skillful- investigator, provide a clue which eventually would
see the witness in a federal court for trial for conspiracy. In the light
69
of recent developments, both in legal temper 68 and in legislation,
the answer is beginning to leave the clue-providing class and become
more and more a necessary link-a material element--of a crime. As
it makes the transition, the necessity for justification of the refusal
to answer becomes less demanding, for any court will see that the question on its face will be incriminating. An excellent illustration of this
point can be had by reference to the new anti-subversive law passed
over the President's veto by the second session of the Eighty-first
Congress. 70 By the terms of that act, communists may not be employed by certain government agencies or even by certain private
concerns, without disclosing their affiliation. Concealment of party
membership is made unlawful, and since party membership itself is
the essential element in the crime, the answer to a question concerning
it cannot be compelled.
Conclusion
The privilege is available to communists, traitors, and criminals.
It may, at times, hamper the promotion of the general welfare and
justice, but it exists as a constant reminder that the purpose of the
courts and legal system is to protect the rights of the individual. It is
best expressed in the words of Lilburn: 7 1
For what is done to anyone, may be done to everyone . . . I judge
it . . . expedient for every man, continually to watch over the rights
and liberties of his country, and to see that they are violated upon none,
though the most vile and dissolute of men; or if they be, speedily to
endeavor redresse; otherwise such violations, breaches, and incroachments
will eat like a Gangrene upon the Common Liberty and become past
remedy....

One writer has criticized the privilege as a relic from the days when
the citizen needed protection against arbitrary proceedings; the opinion
Alexander v. United States, supra note 52.
Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 831, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. (Sept.
23, 1950).
70 Ibid.
71 Lilburn, The Just Defence of John Lilburn (1653), reprinted in HAILEm
AND DAVIES, THE LEvELEIR TRACTS 454 (1944), as cited in 22 So. CAL. L. REv.
307 (1949).
68
69
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is well reasoned and has considerable merit.7 2 However, it is difficult
to see how the privilege can be weakened without again running the
risk of arbitrariness. If the guilty are protected, it is an incidental
effect-a by-product of a procedure which forces the prosecutor to
obtain his evidence from other sources and thereby insure an innocent man, in the hands of a skillful and unscrupulous district attorney,
safety from unwittingly convicting himself.
The overextension of the privilege by the Counselman case 73 is
justly and adequately criticized by Judge Frank and Wigmore. It
should be limited to the area outlined by Chief Justice Marshall in the
Burr case. The answer should bear a close relationship to a material
element of a crime to be privileged; it need not be carried to the
extremes that the Counselman case and those following it have seen
fit to extend it.
The sound logic of Marshall speaks for itself. The Counselman
case, insofar as it insists upon adequate immunity, is sound; but the
purpose of the privilege and the needs of the individual, which are the
only reasons for the existence of the privilege, are adequately served
if the ban on "clue-supplying" answers is lifted.
Wilmer L. McLaughlin
John F. Mendoza

Constitutional Law
RAcLu

SEGREGATION AND THE SEPARATE BUT EQUAL

DocTmRN

Racial segregation is a problem which has perennially confronted
the courts, the legislatures, and the people of this nation. With the
enactment of the three Amendments 1 to the Constitution guaianteeing
equal rights for all citizens regardless of their color, the question
whether separation of the races can be enforced by state law was
placed before the Supreme Court. After the early rulings, which placed
the segregation problem outside the scope of federal legislative power
and within the reasonable exercise of the states' police power,2 the
issue remained relatively dormant for many years, there being but few
cases affecting separation of the races to reach the high Court. But,
while the constitutional aspect of the problem was not prominent, the
72
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See text at note 47 supra.
I U. S. CowsT. Au s. XII, XIV, and XV.
2 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896);
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835 (1883).
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social aspect remained the subject of much controversy. In recent
years the problem in its entirety has become more pressing. Increased
sociological and psychological knowledge acquired throughout the
years,3 the emphasis on the fundamental rights of man resulting from
the atrocities committed in World War II, and the present position
of world leadership of this country 4 have all combined to raise the
issue whether racial segregation is necessarily discriminatory, and thereby depriving members of the minority groups of fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. Recent investigations 5 and proposed
federal legislation,6 as well as arguments of interested groups as
amicus curiae in a rash of cases involving racial segregation, 7 have
brought the constitutional issue into the limelight on the Supreme
Court's calendar. The latest decisions of the high Court, while leaving
the early established principles unchanged, have had a decided effect on
racial segregation.
The Court early decided that separation of the races per se is not
a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The famous case of Plessy v. Ferguson,8 while it concerned
only segregation in local transportation, created the "separate but
equal" doctrine and established the two opposing sides of the controversy. 'In the majority opinion Justice Brown expressed the argument
which has prevailed throughout the years when he said: 9
The object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in
the nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based on color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from

political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation, in places where they are liable to be brought into contact, do not
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have
3 See MmROAL, AN Ax=zRC Dumnr (1944).
4 See To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE
CInL RiGHTS 148 (1947).

PRESIDENT'S ComsTErE ON

5 Id., in the entirety.
6 See, e.k., President's Message to Congress, 95 CoNG. Rxc. 68 (1949).
7 See, e.g., Brief for United States in support of appellant, Henderson v.
United States, 339 U. S. 816 (1950); Brief for Committee of Law Teachers as
Amicus Curiae, Sweatt v. Painter et al., 338 U. S. 865 (1950), Editors, Segregatiot and the Equal Protection Clause, 34 Misu. L. REv. 289 (1950).
8 163 U. S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896).
9 Id., 163 U. S. at 544; see Id., 163 U. S. at 557-62, where Justice Harlan,

expressing the opposing viewpoint in -his dissent, said: "The fundamental objection . . . is that it interferes with the personal freedom of citizens : . . in the
eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. . . . The arbitrary separation of
citizens, on the basis of race ... is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with
the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the constitution. It cannot be justified upon any legal grounds."
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been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency
of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power.

In following the "separate but equal" doctrine the Supreme Court has
consistently said that if there be an equality of privilege which the
laws give to segregated groups, the races may be separated, i.e., that
constitutional invalidity does not arise from the mere fact of separation
but may arise from inequality of treatment.' 0
The field of transportation has been a fruitful source of litigation
concerning racial segregation. The force of the Plessy decision in
intrastate commerce is evidenced by the relatively few cases presented
to the Court thereafter wherein the equal protection clause was involved. The doctrine of "separate but equal" has been and still is the
law in this area, subject, however, to the restrictions of the commerce
clause.
In interstate commerce the first cases involving state segregation
laws were allowed or disallowed depending on whether they were a
prohibited interference with interstate commerce." The constitutional
question from the equal protection point of view was not the issue in
these decisions. It was assumed that the state had a limited right
under the police power to segregate according to races. After the
enactment of Section 3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act 12 the
constitutional question in the interstate transportation cases was eliminated, subsequent cases being decided on a statutory ground. However, the attitude of the Supreme Court in deciding these cases is
significant. In Mitchell v. United States,'3 Mitchell, a Negro traveling
from Chicago to Hot Springs, was compelled to transfer from a first
class to a second class coach upon the train's entry into Arkansas,
there being no first class coaches available for colored persons. This
transfer was enforced by the train's conductor in compliance with
an Arkansas statute requiring separate but equal accommodations for
the white and colored races. The Interstate Commerce Act made it
unlawful for a carrier to subject any person to any "undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever." 14 The
district court affirmed the Commission's dismissal of Mitchell's com10 See, Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631, 68 S. Ct. 299, 92 L. Ed.
247 (1948); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U. S. 80, 61 S. Ct. 873, 85 L. Ed. 1201
(1941); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada. 305 U. S. 337, 59 S. Ct. 232, 83 L. Ed.
208 (1938) ; Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 48 S. Ct. 91, 72 L. Ed. 172 (1927) ;
McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 235 U. S. 151, 35 S. Ct. 69, 59 L. Ed. 169
(1914).
11 C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U. S. 388, 21 S. Ct. 101, 45 L. Ed.
244 (1900); Louisville, N. 0. & T. Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587, 10 S. Ct.
348, 33 L. Ed. 784 (1890); Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. Ed. 547 (1878).
12 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 3 (1) (1946).
13 313 U. S. 80, 61 S. Ct. 873, 85 L. Ed. 1201 (1941).
14 See note 12 supra.
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plaint on the grounds that the state law required the railroad to
separate the passengers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the Act
to have been violated. In its opinion, however, the Court said: 15
The question whether this was a discrimination forbidden by the Interstate Commerce Act is not a question of segregation but one of equality
of treatment. The denial to appellant of equality of accommodations
because of -his race would be an invasion of a fundamental individual
right which is guaranteed against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . and in view of the nature of the right and of our constitutional
policy it cannot be maintained that the discrimination as it was alleged
was not essentially unjust.

It would appear from this language that the "separate but equal"
theory was the standard of measurement used in deciding whether there
had been discrimination. But would the Court's decision have been the
same if there had been first class accommodations available for colored
people?
The Court indicated the answer to this question nine years later in
Henderson v. United States.' 6 In this case the issue was whether the

rules and practices of the Southern Railway Company which required
the division of each dining car so as to allot ten tables exclusively to
white passengers and one table exclusively to negro passengers, and
which called for a curtain or partition between that table and the others,
violate Section 3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act. 1 7 The Court,
in holding the statute violated said: 18
The right to be free from unreasonable discriminations belongs, under
§ 3 (1) to each particular person. Where a dining car is available to
passengers tholding tickets entitling them to use it, each such passenger
is equally entitled to its facilities in accordance with reasonable regulations. The denial of dining service to any such passenger by the rules
before us subjects him to a prohibited disadvantage ....
The rules impose a like deprivation upon white passengers whenever more than 40 of
them seek to be served at the same time and the table reserved for
Negroes is vacant.... Discriminations that operate to the disadvantage
of two groups are not the less to be condemned because their impact is
broader than if only one were affected.
Would not this reasoning apply equally to Pullmans, second class
coaches, etc., as well as to dining cars? Has not the Court by this
reasoning gone one step further than the Mitchell case and made
segregation in interstate transportation all but impossible, even though
the separate accommodations be substantially equal?
The field of education has also been the basis for many cases involving separation of the races. Since it has been consistently held that
15
16
17
'8

See
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See
See

note 12 supra,313 U. S. at 94.
U. S. 816, 70 S. Ct. 843, 94 L. Ed....
note 12 supra.
note 16 supra, 70 S. Ct.-at 847.
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the state has sole control over education within its borders, 19 the constitutional issue in these cases falls under the equal protection clause
and, consequently, the "separate but equal" doctrine has been applied.
The nature of education renders more difficult the problem of determining when the privileges under segregation laws are equal. The various decisions since the Plessy case indicate the construction given the
word equal on the various levels of education. In Cummings v. Richmond County Board of Education20 the Court refrained from enjoining the school board from appropriating money for a high school for
white children even though there was no similar school provided by
the board for colored children. The Court was of the opinion that the
requirement of equality was met where there was in existence, outside
the board's jurisdiction, a private school open to colored students
which would cost them no more than the board would have charged
Negroes to attend a school for colored children.
On the primary level of education the Court, in the case of Gong
Lum v. Rice, 21 held that a state can be said to afford to a Chinese
child the equal protection of the laws by giving her the opportunity
of a free common school education in a school which receives only
children of brown, yellow, or black races.
In recent years the Court has construed the word equal, as it applies
to educational facilities on the higher levels, to mean something different than when it is applied to the lower levels of education. In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada22 it was held that provisions for the
legal education in other states of colored residents of Missouri is insufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement of equal protection
of the laws. The Court said that the petitioner's right was a personal
one and that because of it the state was bound to furnish him, within
its borders, facilities for legal education substantially equal to those
which the state afforded persons of the white race. The Court did not
say what "substantially equal" was, but at least, it had to be provided within the state to be equal. 2 3 Again in Sipeul v. Board of
Regents 24 it was held that the state of Oklahoma, which maintained
a law school for whites, would either have to furnish the colored
people with equal facilities for a legal education or else allow the
colored residents to enter the white law school. The Court did not say
what these equal facilities would be but said that the state, so long
19 Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 48 S. Ct. 91, 72 L. Ed. 172 (1927);
Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528, 20 S. Ct.
197, 44 L. Ed. 262 (1899).
20

175 U. S. 528, 20 S. Ct. 197, 44 L. Ed. 262 (1899).

21
22

305 U. S. 337, 59 S. Ct. 232, 83 L. Ed. 208 (1938).

23

Accord, McCready v. Byrd et al. .... Md ......

275 U. S. 78,48 S. Ct. 91, 72 L. Ed. 172 t1927).

73 A. (2d) 8 (1950),

cert. denied, Oct. 9, 1950, 19 U. S. L. WEEK 3093 (U. S. Oct. 10, 1950).
24 332 U. S. 631, 68 S. Ct. 299, 92 L. Ed. 247 (1948).
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as it provided legal education for whites, would have to provide legal
education for colored students which would be substantially equal to
that given the white students at the state supported schools.
In June 1950 the Court decided two significant cases which further
indicate some of the requirements for equal facilities in graduate and
professional schools. In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents 25 it
was held a denial of equal protection to admit a colored resident to
a heretofore all-white graduate school and then keep him segregated
within the graduate school itself by requiring him to sit in an assigned
row in the classrooms, and at special tables in the library and dining
ball. In pointing out that under these conditions a student would be
receiving unequal treatment in that he would be deprived of the necessary association with his fellow students the Court said: 26
These restrictions were obviously imposed in order to comply, as
nearly as could be, with the statutory requirements of Oklahoma. But
they signify that the State, in administering the facilities it affords for
professional and graduate study, sets McLaurin apart from the other
students. The result is that the appellant is handicapped in his pursuit
of effective graduate instruction. Such restrictions impair and inhibit his
ability to study, to engage in discussions, and exchange views with other
students, and, in general, to learn his profession.

In Sweatt v. Painter,27 decided the same day, a Negro was refused
admission to the all-white University of Texas state supported law
school where his only other alternative was to attend a newly organized
state supported law school for the exclusive use of colored people. In
holding that the Negro petitioner had been denied equal protection
28
the Court said:
• . . petitioner may claim -his full constitutional right: legal education
equivalent to that offered by the State to students of other races. Such
education is not available to him in a separate law school as offered by
the State.

While it was not said that law students within a state could not be
separated, the Court, in stating that the law schools must be substantially equal, listed several requirements necessary
29
equality test:

to fulfill the

Whether the University of Texas Law School is compared with the
original or the new law school for Negroes, we cannot find substantial
equality in the educational opportunities offered white and Negro law
students by the State. In terms of number of the faculty, variety of
courses and opportunity for specialization, size of student body, scope
of the library, availability of law review and similar activities' . . . the
University of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree those
25
26

27
28
29

339 U. S ..... , 70 S. Ct. 851, 94 L. Ed.... (1950).
Id., 70 S. Ct. at 853.
339 U. S ..... 70 S. Ct. 848, 94 L. Ed.
(1950).
Id., 70 S. Ct. at 851.
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qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make
for greatness in a law school Such qualitie-, to name but a few, indude reputation of the faculty, experience of administration, position
and influence of alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige. It is difficult to believe that one who had a free choice between
these law schools would consider the question dose.

It is evident from these two recent cases that because of the more
rigid requirements for equality, compliance with the "separate but
equal" doctrine has become so difficult that it has rendered segregation
laws ineffective on the graduate and professional levels of education.
But might not the same requirement of equality be applied to separate
schools on the undergraduate level? Is not the presence or absence
of an experienced faculty, influential alumni, and a free exchange of
ideas as important on the undergraduate level as it is on the graduate
level? These and other questions will have to await decision on a later
day. Admittedly, if segregated schools can meet the requirements of
equality of treatment they will be tolerated, otherwise not.
The legality of residential segregation has also been before the
Court. In this field the Court, in taking a clear and definite stand,
has invoked not only the equal protection clause but also the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, there is
little room for segregation in places of abode, either by state zoning
laws or by private covenants to be enforced by the state courts.
In 1916 the Court, in Buchanan v. Warley,30 determined the validity
of a city zoning ordinance which prohibited colored people from moving into areas wherein the greater number of houses were occupied by
whites, and vice versa. The ordinance was challenged by a white
petitioner in a suit to enforce the sale of his property to a Negro. In
declaring the law violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
31
Amendment the Court said:
The right which the ordinance annulled was the civil right of a white
man to dispose of his property if he saw fit to do so to a person of
color and of a colored person to make such disposition to a white person.
It is urged that this proposed segregation will promote the public
peace by preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is, and important as
is the preservation of the public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished
by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or protected by the
federal Constitution.

It is interesting to note that this ordinance was invalidated because
it took the petitioner's property without due process, rather than a
denial of equal protection to the Negro. A possible explanation of this
30 245 U. S. 60, 38 S. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149 (1916).
31 Id., 245 U. S. at 81. See also Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U. S. 668, 47 S. Ct.
471, 71 L. Ed. 831 (1926), wherein a similar enactment in New Orleans was
invalidated in a per curiam opinion, "on the authority of Buchanan v. Warley."
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is that the petitioner was a white man and he did not allege violation
of the equal protection of laws.
In determining the constitutionality of private agreements involving
separation of the races the Court takes the stand that as long as the
purposes of the agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to
their terms, no provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment are violated,
since there has been no action by the state.8 2 When, however, the effect
or purposes of these covenants are secured only by judicial enforcement by state courts, such judicial enforcement becomes prohibited
state action within the meaning of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 3 3 When a person is not permitted to buy
property from an owner who is willing to sell, the segrant is denied
equal protection since he is denied rights of ownership or occupancy
enjoyed as a matter of course by other persons of different race or
color.
While segregation enforced by state statute and municipal ordinance
is also prevalent within many states in street cars, hotels, restaurants,
and theaters, no cases touching these matters have reached the Supreme
Court. This may be a result of a realization of the force of the Plessy
decision.
A recent case involving segregation in the field of publicly owned
recreational facilities also illustrates the Court's adherence to the
"separate but equal" doctrine. Rice v. Arnold 34 reached the high
Court as a result of a petition for mandamus to compel the superintendent of the municipally owned and operated golf course in Miami
to permit Negroes to use the course upon the same basis as white
people. The petition challenged the superintendent's rule allocating
facilities of the course exclusively to Negroes on Monday, and reserving the other six days of the week for white people exclusively. The
defendant contended that the one day allotment of facilities of the
golf course to Negroes was not discriminatory since the days of playing
each week were apportioned to the number of white and colored golfers
according to the record of the course kept by the superintendent. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari but vacated the judgment of the
Florida Supreme court, and, without hearing argument, instructed the
Florida court to reconsider its decision denying mandamus in the light
of the Sweatt and McLaurin cases. 35 Since in these two cases the
"separate but equal" doctrine was the express basis of the Court's
decision, this instruction would seem to be a manifestation of the
Court's conviction that the time schedule as set up by the golf course
32
33

Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323, 46 S. Ct. 521, 70 L. Ed. 969 (1926).
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948).
19 U. S. L. W xX 3103 (U. S. Oct. 17, 1950).
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35 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S ..... , 70 S. Ct. 851, 94
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superintendent did not meet the requirements of the "separate but
equal" doctrine. The Court apparently thought that the facilities
offered Negroes under this time schedule were not equal to those offered the whites.
It is evident that the Supreme Court by its decisions has partially
settled the legal aspects of the racial segregation problem. Segregation
in public, graduate and legal education has been made practically impossible. In interstate transportation the Henderson case has eliminated segregation in dining cars, and left the legality of separation in
other phases of interstate transportation in grave doubt.. Residential
segregation has also been eliminated to the extent of declaring zoning
laws unconstitutional, and disallowing state enforcement of private
restrictive agreements. In state provided recreational facilities, separation of the races has been made more difficult by the tightening of
the equality requirements. However, while alleviating the racial problem by a more rigid application of the equality test, the Court has not
varied the constitutional principle underlying the "separate but equal"
doctrine.
While the cases and the federal statutes on the subject illustrate the
eagerness of the federal government to prohibit segregation whenever
and wherever it is within its power to do so, yet, the fact remains
that the Supreme Court has decided that under our constitutional
system state governments still have the power to segregate according
to races if they so deem it necessary for the common good of the state. 36
Regardless of what may be said in favor of the complete abolition
of racial segregation by federal legislation, the police power of the
state must still be respected. The Court has chosen to base its decisions on the ultimate ground that a citizen does not have, guaranteed
by the Constitution, a fundamental right not to be segregated. The
Supreme Court has manifested, throughout the years, a profound respect for the separation of po.wers principle where states have found
it necessary in the exercise of their police power to segregate on the
basis of race.
Patrick F. Coughlin
William J. O'Connor
36 It is highly probable that in the future racial segregation will be challenged as being violative of the United Nations Charter. But to declare separation of the races violative of the United Nations Charter it would be necessary
for the Court to hold: First, that the Charter has the force of a treaty and is
therefore the supreme law of the land; second, that a citizen living in the United
States under this Charter -has, guaranteed by the Charter, a fundamental right
not to be segregated according to race. For a recent decision of a state court
holding that the Charter -has the force of a treaty and is therefore the supreme
law of the land, see Sei Fujii v. State, .... Cal. App ..... , 217 P. (2d) 481 (1950).
For a further discussion of this case, see CoNsTmir0NAL. LAW-TREATIES in the

"Recent Decision" section of this issue.
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Evidence
SPOUSE As

COMPLAINING WITNESS IN NON-VIOLENCE
CRIMINAL ACTIONS

Practicing lawyers and prosecutors are frequently confronted with
the very practical problem of procedure and evidence when a wife
is desirous of instituting criminal proceedings against her husband, and
subsequently acting as the prosecuting witness. Marital testimony in
criminal actions is usually categorized 1 into three main problems,
namely: privileged communications; ability to testify for 2 the spouse;
and, ability to testify against the spouse. By far the greater amount
of controversy centers on the last named category, and this article
will be confined to this phase.
At early common law the wife was barred from testifying against
her husband under any circumstances because of the theory that her
identity was merged in her husband's. The theory included the idea
that a woman was nothing more than a mere chattel,3 and as such,
was powerless to disturb the supposed domestic tranquility. It soon
became apparent that both the family and the state required some
safeguard for the wife's person. 4 An exception to the privilege was
instituted which has become practically universal today.5 The wife is
permitted to institute actions against her spouse and to be a competent witness for the prosecution, when the charge is one of personal, i.e.; corporal violence to her. The violence, however, is not always in the physical sense.
3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 226 (1935).
See 20 MnN. L. Rzv. 693 (1935), in which the writer states: "It is to be
noted that while the disqualification of one spouse to appear as a witness for the
other has been almost wholly removed in the states, the trend of the statutes,
except in a minority of jurisdictions, has been not to alter essentially the common
law conceptions as to admissibility of evidence by one spouse against the other,
except to broaden the scope of personal offense by one against the other."
s "The privilege evolved at a time in history when the wife was little better
than the chattel of her husband, and when the law's grasp of the psychology of
interpersonal relationships was naive." 29 NEB. L. REv. 108 (1950). For an
interesting treatise on this subject, see Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations
on the Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. Rnv. 675 (1929).
4 3 OiLa. L. REv. 225 (1950): "The early lawyers did not fail to realize
that the privilege could be subject to abuse and an exception was engrafted upon
the rule that permitted the wife or the husband, who was the victim of a wrong
by the other, to appeal to the courts unrestricted by the privilege. The exception
was a product of necessity and one which was apparently somewhat narrow in
scope and limited to the actual protection of the spouse (Bentley v. Cooke, 3
. . . that necessity is not a general necesDoug. 422, 99 Eng. Rep. 729 (1784)sity, as where no other witness can be had,, but a particular necessity, as where,
for instance, the wife would otherwise be exposed without remedy to personal
1
2

injury')"
5

2 WIGmoRE, EviDENcE § 612 (3rd ed. 1940).
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The problem, then, is to determine what is "personal" violence
as it appears in many state statutes. The great majority of states not
using the word "personal" resort to the phrase "an offense committed
by one against the other." 6 Naturally, the cases are replete with the
problem of what is an offense by one against the other.
I.
Instituting Criminal Actions
The common prerequisites for a person instituting criminal actions
are that the complainant have knowledge of the facts of the crime and
be a person competent to testify to the facts in the complaint.7
The latter requirement has prompted the courts to consistently
hold that a wife could not institute proceedings against her husband
unless she was competent to testify against him in the trial of the
crime. 8 This standard has been followed in determining her eligibility
to present facts before a grand jury, 9 to swear out a complaint against
her husband, 10 and to swear out an affidavit for having a warrant
issued. 1 Thus, in order for a wife to be a competent complaining
witness, it is first necessary to ascertain if she qualifies as a valid witness for the particular crime. This necessitates a thorough understanding of the statutes on competency of witnesses, plus the current
interpretation given the statutes by the courts, as well as the courts'
application of the common law privilege.
II.
Competency of Wife Under Statutes Permitting Her to Testify in a
Trial for Crime Committed by "One Against the Other"
(a) Against the Property of the Other:
Unfortunately, states having similar statutes permitting one spouse
to testify against the other for a crime committed by "one against the
For a modern statute see VA. CODE ANN. § 8-288 (1950).
7 People v. Stickle, 156 Mich. 557, 121 N. W. 497 (1909).
8 Bell v. State, 14 Ga. App. 809, 82 S. E. 376 (1914); Smith v. State, 14 Ga.
App. 614, 81 S. B. 912 (1914); People v. Bladek, 259 Il. 69, 102 N. E. 243
(1913) ; Tulman v. State, 37 Ind. 353 (1871); Ex parte Dickinson, 132 S.W. (2d)
243 (Mo. App. 1939); State v. Berlin, 42 Mo. 572 (1868); State v. Snyder, 93
N. J. L. 18, 107 At. 167 (1919), aff'd 94 N. J. Eq. 377, 109 Atl. 925 (1920);
People v. Budzinski, 159 Misc. 566, 289 N. Y. Supp. 656 (1936); State v. Coats,
130 N. C. 701, 41 S. E. 706 (1902); Stribling v. State, 88 Tex. Crim. Rep. 195,
215 S. W. 857 (1919); Thomas v. State, 14 Tex. App. 70 (1883).
9 People v. Bladek, supra note 8; People v. Budzinski, supra note 8; State
v. Coats, supra note 8; State v. Snyder, supra note 8.
10 State v. Berlin, 42 Mo. 572 (1868); Stribling v. State, 88 Tex. Crim.
Rep..195, 215 S. W. 857 (1919).
11 Bell v. State, 14 Ga. App. 809, 82 S. E. 376 (1914); Smith v. State, 14
Ga. App. 614, 81 S. E. 912 (1914); Tulman v. State, 37 Ind. 353 (1871);
6
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other" have failed to interpret their statutes in the same light. In fact,
the different interpretations are as numerous as the exceptions to the
parol evidence rule. 12 It might be said that there are three schools of
thought on the subject.
One such school, led notably by Texas, 13 is that the statute is
merely declaratory of the common law, i.e., there must be a personal
violence 14 committed against the wife before she is competent to
testify against her spouse. In a Texas court it was held that a wife
could not be a competent witness against her husband in the larceny
of a mule, allegedly the separate property of the wife. The court
stated: 15
This provision of the code cannot, in our opinion, be properly given
so broad an interpretation as to permit husbands and wives to testify
against their property. To give it such a construction would be to make
a marked innovation upon a well established common-law rule of evidence not required or warranted by its language.

A further illustration of a construction virtually declaratory of the
common law is in the case of Meade v. Commonwealth,16 where the
forgery by the husband of the wife's name on a deed was held not
an "offense committed by one against another," within the terms of
the statute. The court said:17
The words "offense" and "criminal offense" are used interchangeably
in our statute. As used, they mean a "prosecution for a criminal offense,"
and not a proceeding based merely on a private wrong.

Another jurisdiction which supports this concept is Washington.
In State v. Kephurt 18 the wife was deemed incompetent to testify
against her husband for the crime of arson on the ground that the
statute l" was merely declaratory of the common law privilege.
The better and more reasonable rule of the second school can be
found in the decisions of Colorado,2 0 Iowa 21 and Nebraska. 22 A ColoEx parte Dickinson, 132 S. E. (2d) 243 (Mo. App. 1939); Thomas v. State, 14
Tex.App. 70 (1883).
12 Note, 25 NoTRE DAME LAW. 330 (1950).
13 Compton v. State, 13 Tex. App. 271 (1882).
14 Baxter v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 516, 31 S. W. 394 (1895); Compton
v. State, supra note 13; Overton v. State, 43 Tex. 616 (1875); Meade v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 775, 43 S. E. (2d) 858 (1947); State v. Kelphart, 56 Wash.
561, 106 Pac. 165 (1910).
15 Overton v. State, supra note 14, 43 Tex. at 618.
16 186 Va. 775, 43 S. E. (2d) 858o(1947).
17 Id., 43 S. E. (2d) at 863.
18 56 Wash. 571, 106 Pac. 165 (1910).
19 WAsH.ANN.CODE & STAr. § 5994 (Ballinger 1897).
20 Emerick v. People, 110 Colo. 572, 136 P. (2d) 668 (1943); O'Loughlin v.
People, 90 Colo. 368, 10 P. (2d) 543 (1932); Wilkinson v. People, 86 Colo. 406,
282 Pac. 257 (1929) ; Dill v. People, 19 Colo. 469, 36 Pac. 229 (1894).
21 State v. Shultz, 177 Iowa 321, 158 N. W. 539 (1916); State v. Hurd,
101 Iowa 391, 70 N. W. 613 (1897); State v. Chambers, 87 Iowa 1, 53 N. W.
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rado court, in a case of recent date, held that a wife was competent
to testify against her husband for the crime of obtaining bonds from
her by false pretenses aid by using her as the victim of the confidence
game.23 Although this state has a statute within the general class
24
under consideration, the court did not refer to the code but declared:
. . . she [the wife] was the individual particularly and directly injured
and affected by the alleged crime for which the defendant was prosecuted, and consequently was a competent witness against him.

The same court had in 1894 permitted a wife to testify against her
husband for the crime of perjury in divorce proceedings against her.
That court considered the language of the statute was broad enough
to include any crime, whether of violence or otherwise, which directly
affected the wife, and stated that she could testify "wherever she is
the individual particularly and directly injured or affected by the
crime." 25 An Oklahoma court in a case on all fours with the Colorado
2 6

case, and with a comparable statute, reached the same result.

The third school might be said to be that as expressed by the legislature of some states.2 7 Mindful of the narrow construction given by
some courts to the type of statute under discussion the legislatures expressly broadened its scope by permitting a spouse to testify for any
crime committed "against the person or property of the other." These
statutes have been construed more broadly than the typical statute
above has been interpreted by the jurisdictions of the first school
(Texas), but not as liberally as constructions evolved by the second
school (Colorado). This legislative compromise will be discussed forthwith in the section on miscellaneous statutes.
(b)

Crimes Against the Morals and Dignity of the Wife:
Though there is much diversification in an interpretation of what
crimes affect property, the scope of what constitutes a crime against
"morals and dignity" is seemingly unlimited. A fortiori, in attempting
to resolve the problem, the courts have been prompted to make constant distinctions between the different classifications of these crimes,
e.g., adultery,2 8 incest,2 9 rape, a0 and abandonment.a
1090 (1893); State v. Hughes, 58 Iowa 165, 11 N. W. 706 (1882); State v.
Sloan, 55 Iowa 217, 7 N. W. 516 (1880); State v. Bennett, 31 Iowa 24 (1870).
22 Hills v. State, 61 Neb. 589, 85 N. W. 836 (1901); Lord v. State, 17 Neb.
526, 23 N. W. 507 (1885).
23 Emerick v. People, 110 Colo. 572, 136 P. (2d) 668, 669 (1943).
24 Ibid.
25 Dill v. People, 19 Colo. 469, 36 Pac. 229, 233 (1894).
26 West v. State, 13 Okla. Crim. Rep. 312, 164 Pac. 327 (1917).
27 ARx. STAT. ANN.§ 43.2020 (1947); CAL. PEN.CODE § 1322 (1949).
28 State v. Bennett, 31 Iowa 24 (1870); State v. Lusher, 131 Minn. 97, 154
N. W. 735 (1915); State v. Armstrong, 4 Minn. 33$, 4 Gil. 251 (1860); Heacock
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In 1913, Justice Furman of the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma concisely expressed the modem tenets which would permit a wife
to testify against her husband for the crimes mentioned above.3 2 After
stating that the pivotal question depends upon what constitutes "a
crime against the other," Justice Furman went on to say: 33
In reason and in justice we believe that whenever a husband or wife
is guilty of conduct, which constitutes a public offense, and which also
constitutes a direct violation of the legal rights of the other, the crime
is against such other, as well as against the public, and that such husband or wife should be permitted to testify in all such cases.... Considering the substance rather than the form of things, we are of the
opinion that the idea that the wife can only testify against her husband
for an assault committed upon her person is a relic of barbarism.
34
Still in search of the answer to the question Justice Furman proceeds:

What is the meaning of this phrase, "a crime committed one against
the other?" Is it merely declaratory of the common law, meaning in
fact, when personal violence is inflicted by one against the other, or
has it a broader meaning, based upon the philosophy of the rule, and
including all crimes interrupting and objectionable to the marriage relation ?
A respectable army of authorities, we concede, might be cited in
support of the narrower construction. But the courts in those cases, we
respectfully submit, have blindly followed precedents not based upon
reason, and have yielded to that foolish sentimental impulse, which, as
Mr. Wigmore so rightly remarks, is the real foundation of this rule. This
court has declared more than once that it will follow no precedents not
founded upon reason; that Oklahoma should be ruled by the living and
not the dead.

Finally Justice Furman sums up his convictions in this manner: 35
We do not believe this court will say that we have so foolish a public
policy in Oklahoma that closes the lips of an abandoned and deserted
wife, in order that the family harmony and concord which has been utterly
destroyed by the husband's acts shall not be further disturbed.

In passing, it might be well to note that the belief of the same court
ten years later had somewhat contracted. The court in the case of
v. State, 4 Okla. Crim. Rep. 606, 112 Pac. 949 (1911); Hall v. State, 148 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 459, 188 S. W. (2d) 388 (1945); Thomas v. State, 14 Tex. App.
70 (1883).
29 State v. Shultz, 177 Iowa 321, 158 N. W. 539 (1916); State v. Chambers, 87 Iowa 1, 53 N. W. 1090 (1893); Toth v. State, 141 Neb. 448, 3 N. W.
(2d) 899 (1922); State v. Burt, 17 S.D. 7, 94 N. W. 409 (1903).
30 Cargill v. State, 25 Okla. Crim. Rep. 314, 220 Pac. 64 (1923).
31 Wilkinson v. People, 86 Colo. 406, 282 Pac. 257 (1929); Harris- v. State,
80 Neb. 195, 114 N. W. 168 (1907).
32 Hunter v. State, 10 Okla. Crim. Rep. 119, 134 Pac. 1134 (1913).

33 Id., 134 Pac. at 1135.
Id., 134 Pac. at 1136.
35 Id., 134 Pac. at 1138.

34
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Cargill v. State 36 held that the wife was not a competent witness against
her husband in a prosecution against him for rape or assault to commit rape upon a third person. Justice Bessey, speaking for the court,
stated it thusly:87
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the
person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly
affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The
better rile is that, when an offense directly attacks or directly and vitally
impairs the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute
that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed one against the other. In this sense
the commission of rape by a husband upon a third person is not a crime
against the wife within the meaning of our statute.

Is adultery a crime "against the other" under these statutes? Perhaps the most notable case constituting one spouse a competent witness against the other is State v. Bennett.3s Here the court reasoned
that the statute requiring one spouse to be the complainant in an
adultery action, conclusively indicated legislative intent that adultery
was more a crime against the innocent spouse than a public wrong.
Likewise, Arizona, in its penal code sections dealing with adultery
specifically requires that one of the spouses institute the action. 39
Perhaps with more uniformity than in the other "immoral" crimes,
the courts have held that incest is not a crime against the wife under
the statutes. Iowa alone, perhaps, has firmly adhered to the proposi40
tion that incest is a crime against the other spouse.
In State v. Burt, Justice Haney conveniently classified the crimes
a husband can commit: 41

With reference to this statute the -husband's crimes might be classified thus: (1) Those which are against persons other than -his wife;
(2) those which are against no particular person; and (3) those which
are against his wife. It is only in actions for crimes belonging to the
last-mentioned class that the wife can testify for or against her husband
without his consent.

This classification poses the question: is this not the same as the
common law exception requiring physical injury? Are there no crimes
against the marital relationship of husband and wife? This question
continues to reappear in all cases involving crimes which insult the
moral dignity of the spouse, although they are not directed at her
physical person.
36

25 Okla. Crim. Rep. 314, 220 Pac. 64 (1923).

37 Id., 220 Pac. at 67.

31 Iowa 24 (1870).
39 ARiZ. CoDE ANw. § 43-401 (1939).
40 State v. Chambers, 87 Iowa 1, 53 N. W. 1090 (1893).
41 State v. Burt, 17 S. D. 7, 94 N. W. 409, 411 (1903).
38
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III.
Competency of Wife Under Miscellaneous Statutes
(a) Against the Property of the Other:
Further delineations of the statutes are impossible because of the
wide range of miscellaneous codes pertaining to the spouse's competency. It should be noted, however, that the trend in this property
subdivision is to broaden the spouse's competency. In the final analysis
these anomalous statutes must be interpreted by discerning the legislative intent and the courts' desire to widen the restrictive common
law privilege.
In California a husband was competent to testify against his wife
for the crime of grand larceny because the statute 42 included the word
"property" in an exception similar to the type of statute under discussion in the first section of this article, i.e., "for a crime committed
by one against the person or property of the other." The California
43
court said:
Evidently the amendment to . . . the Penal Code was adopted ...
to expressly authorize a spouse to testify against the other one in a
criminal action involving a crime against either the person or the property
of the witness. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under a statute 44 making either spouse competent to testify in
criminal proceedings for bodily injury or violence attempted, a Pennsylvania court held a wife competent to testify against her husband
for libel. 4 5 Likewise the Pennsylvania court, under the same statute,
held a wife competent to testify against her husband when he conspired to cause her to be committed to an insane asylum. 4 6
(b)

Crimes Against the Morals and Dignity of the Wife:

Arkansas has a statute 47 similar to that of California, 48 which
makes the spouse competent to testify against the other for crimr~es
against the person or the property of the other. However, the same
court under the same statute held that a wife was competent in an
action of abandonment although she was regarded as not competent
for the crime of rape. 49 In this case the court interpreted the excep42 CAL. PEN. CoDE § 1322 (1949). ". . . or in case of criminal actions or
proceedings for a crime committed by one against the person or prope-ty of the
other. .. "
43 In re Kellogg, 41 Cal. App. (2d) 833, 107 P. (2d) 964, 966 (1940).
44 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 683 (1930).
45
Commonwealth v. Nairn, 30 Pa. Dist. 883 (1920).
46 Commonwealth v. Spink, 137 Pa. 255, 20 AtI. 680 (1890).
41 ARX. STAT. ANN. § 43.2020 (1947).
4S See note 42 supra.
49 Wilson v. State, 125 Ark. 234, 188 S. W. 554 (1916).
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tion allowing one spouse to testify against the other to mean an injury
against the person or property of the husband or wife while they occupy
that relation. Therefore, a wife could not testify against her husband
for rape committed prior to their marriage. Just ten yprs later the
court interpreted the statute to mean that either spouse could testify
against the other in a criminal prosecution in any case where the
offense involved an injury to the spouse personally, in addition to the
effect upon society. 50
Very recently a California court extended the existent liberal code
provisions to make a wife competent to testify against her husband
for the crime of selling her for immoral purposes. 51
Bigamy does not make the wife compietent to testify in Mississippi 52
though that state has a statute 53 which makes a wife competent in all
controversies which occur between the spouses. The same result was
reached in Michigan 54 in spite of statutes 55 which permit the spouse
to testify in cases where the cause of action grows out of a personal
wrong or injury done by one to the other. The crime of bigamy was
held not to be a personal wrong or injury to the defendant's first wife
under such a statute. Massachusetts has a statute 56 which precludes
compulsory testimony by one spouse against the other. This statute
has been construed by the court in Commonwealth v. Barker,57 a case
involving the crime of polygamy, that: "There is nothing which prevents a husband or wife from testifying against the other in criminal
proceedings if the one testifying is willing to do so."
Conclusions
Fortunately, there has been a decidedly liberal extension of the
common law exception in thle federal courts. Since the common law
is not applicable in federal criminal cases, an encouraging number of
federal cases, decided under the realistic federal procedural rules, have
noticeably diminished the strict application of the exception.5"
50

Murphy v. State, 171 Ark. 620, 286 S. W. 871 (1926).

51 People v. Tidwell, 61 Cal. App. (2d) 58, 141 P. (2d) 969 (1943).
52 McQueen v. State, 139 Miks. 457, 104 So. 168 (1925).
53 Miss. CODE ANN . § 1689 (1942): " . .. shall be competent witness in
their own behalf, as against each other, in all controversies between them."
54 People v. Quanstrom, 93 Mich. 254, 53 N. W. 165 (1892).
55 MIcH. STAT. § 7546 (1885). This statute as it now stands, MIcE. STAT.
Axx. § 27.916 (1938), expressly provides that a spouse shall be competent to
testify in "suits for divorce and cases of prosecution for bigamy..."
56
57

MASS. ANN. LAWS § 233-20 (1933).
185 Mass. 324, 70 N. E. 203 (1904).

58 Shores v. United States, 174 F. (2d) 838 (8th Cir. 1949); Hayes v.
United States, 168 F. (2d) 996 (10th Cir. 1948); Levine v. United States, 163
F. (2d) 992 (5th Cir. 1947); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F. (2d) 1006 (2nd
Cir.), aff'd, 138 F. (2d) 831 (2nd Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 794, 64 S. Ct.
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Despite the many valid and logical arguments posed, 59 the "state
courts seem reluctant in the absence of explicit legislative language to
discard the archaic rule of privilege." 60 One of the main reasons for
the continued adherence to the rule is public policy, i.e., the "privilege
is based upon a desire to preserve the marital relation and avoid family
discord." 61 But is not all family harmony gone when one spousp
desires to be a complaining witness against the other? On the otber
hand, valuable testimony is frequently barred, which would aid in
a fair determination of a criminal case upon its merits. Many spouses
ate thereby not adequately protected from injustice perpetrated upon
them in respect to the marriage relationship as well as to their property
rights. The much disputed old bugbear against inducing perjury seems
to be a rather inadequate reason for the rule of incompetency of the
spouse. Nor is the oft-cited reason of protecting family unity of compelling force in view of the alarming, but legally sanctioned, divorce
rate of the present day. Further, the passage of the Married Womens'
Acts, 6

2

the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution,6 3 and64the present social and economic status of women
must be considered.
Today marriage is not, unfortunately, as permanent a legal institution as it was when the common law lawyers inaugurated the exception, and now most "testimony by a witness against her husband represents not the cause but the effect of a split home." 65
Even before the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment existing
state statutes which merely tended to codify the common law excep785, 88 L. Ed. 1083 (1944); Yoder v. United States, 80 F. (2d) 665 (10th Cir.
1935); Denning v. United States, 247 Fed. 463 (5th Cir. 1918); Pappas v. United
States, 241 Fed. 665 (9th Cir. 1917). Contra: United States v. Walker, 176 F.
(2d) 564 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 891, 70 S. Ct. 239, 94 L. Ed. 146
(1949).
59 For interesting discussions of the privilege in particular jurisdictions, see
the following:
California: Hines, Privileged Testimony of Husband and Wife in California,
19 CALIF. L. REv. 390 (1931) ;

Canada: Comment, 28 CAN. B. Rxv. 585 (1950);
Kentucky:

Note, 38 Ky. L. J. 459 (1950);

Louisiana: O'Connor, The Qualifications of Defendant's Spouse as a Witness
in Criminal Cases, 9 NoTR DAmm LAW. 272 (1934);
North Carolina: Note, 26 N. C. L. Rav. 206 (1948);
Tennessee: Note, 3 VAND. L. Rav. 298 (1950);

Wisconsin: Gollmar, MaritalPrivilege, [19451 Wis. L. Ray. 232.
60

61
62
63
64
65

Comment, 29 NEB. L. REv. 108, 110 (1950).
[19451 Was. L. REv. 232.
3 VERNiER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 167.
U. S. CoNsT. AmEND. XIX.
8 WIoMoRE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 2228 at p. 232.
30 B. U. L. REv. 135 (1950).
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tion, were criticized by active members of the bar. As early as 1917
a practicing attorney of Kentucky wrote of his state code: 66
Those words suggest the days of chivalry and must have been written
when Kentucky gentlemen all read Sir Walter Scott, kept their wives
secluded in the home, and took over their property on marriage as a
matter of right under the beneficient provisions of the common law.
They may have worked well in the days of coverture. But the wife is
now an entity, a human being, a citizen. All the ways of the earth are
open to her. She pursues all business avocations and fills all professions.
*

.

.

I submit that no law ought to protect those guilty of wrong

by sealing the mouth of the spouse who knows the facts and is
willing to testify. What sort of a public policy is that? Is justice and
right between the parties litigant less sacred than the relation of husband
and wife? Again, submit that no husband nor wife should distrust
the spouse or feel less affection because that spouse has told the truth
that justice might be done. We cannot build our sacred institutions, we
cannot sanctify the home, we cannot inspire or perpetuate affection between husband and wife by a lie or by the suppression of the truth.
And logic might suggest that permitting the husband or wife to testify
against the other might be a great restraint against wrongdoing.

Certainly the Kentucky attorney succinctly and poignantly defined
the problem and voiced the view of many modern writers, nearly
unanimous in their condemnation of the privilege. It would appear
that resolute progress is occurring, for "we are moving in the direction
of allowing the trier of the facts to hear all the evidence," as the court
said in Funk v. United States.67 The interest or relationship of the
witness should merely be a consideration in detlermining the weight
to be given to the testimony, not a ground for complete disqualification. Progressive advocates of the elimination of the rule were heartened
by the Yoder v. United States 68 decision, for the conclusion reached
was "in accord with the views of a strong modern school of commentators, who contend there is no reason to sacrifice personal justice for
the sake of a mythical family unity, or to apply the rules of cricket
to the law of evidence for the sake of a dubious social benefit." 69
In an attempt to serve better, in a very practical sense, the ends
of justice, the trial judge 70 should be permitted to exercise his judgment and experienced discretion in order to fulfill the dual role of
ascertaining the actual need for truth and protecting the marital
harmony-singularly difficult problems to resolve. Of course, the need
for a judge performing such a duty would be ended, should the state
legislatures rid the statutes of the privilege.
Presumably it is not the theorists and academicians alone who espouse the termination of such an outdated privilege, for the American
66
6T

68
69
70

6 Ky. L. J. 45 (1917) as quoted in 38 Ky. L. 3. 459, 461 (1950).
290 U. S. 371, 54 S. Ct. 212, 78 L. Ed. 363 (1933).
80 F. (2d) 665 (10th Cir. 1935).
Comment, 10 So. CAL. L. REv. 94 (1936).
Comment, 38 GEo. L. J. 316 (1950).
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Bar Association has recommended the abolition, 7 1 and the very practical and concise MODEL CODE OF EviDENCE, Rules 215, 216 (1942),
presented by the American Law Institute omitted the privilege in toto.
"The privilege has also been criticized as a 'curious piece of policy,'
in that it consults the wrongdoer's own interests in determining whether
justice shall have its course against him." 72 Bentham says that the
privilege "not only makes every man's home his castle, but aids in
converting it into a den of thieves." 73
In practice the rule has been an undesirable one for many reasons.
Legislatures have devised new exceptions as difficulties have arisen
and the rule has been riddled with an endless variety of complexities.
Some courts, "mayhap while praising the rule, have gone out of their
way to escape its logical conclusions." 74 Other courts, in both code
and common law states, have religiously followed the exception ad
litleram.
It is apparent that the reason for the privilege has long since been
vitiated and with the single exception of actual marital communications, the old common law rule should be interred thus terminating
at last one of the vicissitudes with which the procedural law of evidence
has been plagued for centuries.
Truth, and truth alone, should be the conclusive criterion henceforth. State courts and legislatures would serve the cause of justice
more fully, should they follow the judicial path marked by recent
federal decisions and some few state courts.
Arthur L. Beaudette
Henry M. Shine, Jr.

Wills
THE RIGHT OF AN ANNUITANT TO ELECT TO TAxE EITHER
THE PRINCIPAL SuM OR THE ANNUITY PAYMENTS

Introduction
For centuries the broad policy of English law has favored and promoted the free alienation of absolute interests, whether of realty or
personalty. Attempts to limit such interests by restrictions inconsistent with their absolute nature have been rejected by the English courts.
71
72

63 A. B. A. REP. 594 (1938).
Comment, 24 CArlM. L. REv. 472 (1936).

73

7 BENTHAm, RATIONALE OF JUDIciAL EvIDENCE 481 n. (Bowring ed. 1827),

as cited in 24 CALiF. L. REv. 472, 473 n. (1936).
74 19 CArAt. L. REv. 390, 409 (1930).
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No better example of the workings of this policy may be cited than
the right of a cestui, of full age, sound mind, and enjoying the whole
equitable interest, to terminate a trust and obtain the conveyance of
the legal title to the trust property from the trustee.1 Another reflection of the policy is the doctrine that a legatee for whom a testator
directs the purchase of an annuity may elect to take the principal sum
in lieu of the prescribed payments. It is with this latter English rule
and its relation to the American cases that this article is primarily concerned.
The right of a legatee to take the principal sum instead of the
annuity payments as directed by a will has long been established in
England. 2 Thus where the interest over such a legacy is vested absolutely, without a gift over, the legatee may elect to take the capital
amount even against the express intention of the testator that he shall
not have such option. 3 The problem is, of course, restricted to those
cases in which the will directed the purchase of an annuity, rather than
the payment of an annual sum out of the estate, it having been held
that no right of election existed in the latter case. 4
However, as will be shown, the doctrine has had a mixed reception
in the United States. The purpose of this treatise is to indicate the
origin and development of the rule in England, its introduction into
this country by the New York courts, and through a survey of the
American cases, its present status, limitations and effect in American
law.
I.

The English Background
The earliest case discussing the right of the beneficiary to elect to
take the capital sum was decided in 1725. In this case, Yates v. Compton,5 the point was not actually in issue as the legatee had died before
the purchase of the annuity had been made, but her administrator filed
a bill praying an order to pay the principal sum into her estate. In
granting the request, the court indicated by way of dictum that the
annuitant would have had the same right had she lived. In its opinion.
the court purported to discover the intent of the testator that his heirat-law should be deprived of all his inheritance, and was perhaps so
impressed by this desire of the testator that it refused to permit the
legacy to fail.
1
2

4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TUSTEES § 1002 (1948).

Yates v. Compton, 2 P. Wins. 309, 24 Eng. Rep. 743 (1725).
3 Stokes v. Cheek, 28 Beav. 620, 54 Eng. Rep. 504 (1860); Re Browne's
Will, 27 Beav. 324, 54 Eng. Rep. 127 (1859); Woodmeston v. Walker, 2 Russ.
& M. 197, 39 Eng. Rep. 370 (1831).
4 Carmichael v. Gee et al., 5 App. Cas. 58a (1880); Wright v. Callender, 2
De G. M. & G. 652, 42 Eng. Rep. 1027 (1852).
5 2 P. Wins. 308, 24 Eng. Rep. 743 (1725).
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Virtually the same situation prevailed in a later case, 6 in which the
person for whom the annuity was to be purchased committed suicide
two days after the testator's death. The court held that the annuitant's
personal representatives were entitled to the principal sum, and stated
in the course of the opinion that: 7
The interference of the Court against the will of the legatee to
compel the laying out the money in an annuity for a person ... would
have been perfectly nugatory and vain.
Again in Bayley v. Bishop 8 in 1803, the court permitted the representative of a legatee to take the principal sum although the legatee
had predeceased the life-tenant, the proceeds of whose estate were to
be used in the purchase of the annuity according to the direction in
the will. The court declared that an absolute interest vested in the
legatee at the time of the testator's death though it did not take effect
until the death of the life-tenant. The court said: 9
. . . it is clear, he [the testator] meant an annuity to be purchased
with the £500; which is the same in effect as giving a legacy of
1500 to his son; for upon a bill filed he might have received the
money; and the Court would not have compelled the trustees to lay
it out in an annuity.
Here again is indicated the consideration underlying all the English
cases, i. e., that such an order to purchase an annuity is the same as an
outright bequest of a sum of money.
The extent of the doctrine is indicated by Palmer v. Craufurd10
where the legatee expressed an intention to accept the legacy but failed
to fulfill one of the requirements for the issuance (i.e., personal appearance at the government annuity office) and died before its purchase.
As in the preceeding cases, his personal representative secured a decree
directing payment of the capital amount.
The English courts, in permitting the election between the annuity
and the principal sum, have denied any distinction between legacies
specifying the expenditure of a certain amount for the purchase of an
annuity, and one which merely specifies that an annuity producing a
stated income be purchased."
They have held that in the latter situation no great difficulty is encountered in determining at any given time
how much of an investment will be necessary to produce the income
12
specified in the will.
A more detailed enunciation of the doctrine of free alienability of
chattels as applied to bequests of annuities was made in Woodmeston v.
6 Barnes v. Rowley, 3 Ves. Jun. 305, 30Eng. Rep. 1024 (1797).

7 Id., 30 Eng. Rep. at 1025.
8 9 Ves. Jun. 6, 32 Eng. Rep. 501 (1803).
9 Id., 32 Eng. Rep. at 503.
10 3 Swans. 482, 36 Eng. Rep. 945 (1819).
11 Dawson v. Hearn, 1 Russ. & M. 606, 39 Eng. Rep. 232 (1831).
12 In re Robbins, [1907] 2 Ch. 8.

NOTES
Walker,' 3 where the will in question expressly stated that the legatee
was "without power.., to assign or sell the same by way of anticipation or otherwise." The court declared the legatee entitled to the principal sum, applying by analogy the rule prohibiting the placing of restrictions on real property inconsistent with the nature of the interest
given. However, the court indicated that if the forbidden act of alienation was accompanied by a penalty by way of a gift over, which would
determine the legatee's interest, the court would honor the restriction.
The English courts have carried this theory of the right to demand
the capital sum to the extent of permitting an election even where the
testator expressly forbade an election or alienation. Here the argument
cannot be made that the testator must be deemed familiar with the law
and hence intended to give the beneficiary the right of election. One
early decision 14 justified this course of action on policy grounds and
denied the right of a testator to encumber an absolute gift so as to
prevent alienation. A later case, 15 involving a will which declared the
legatee to be without power of anticipation as to the annuity directed
to be purchased, merely granted the legatee's petition for an order declaring her to be entitled to the principal sum without opinion. And
where a will stated that the beneficiary should not be allowed to accept
the value of the annuity in lieu of the income, the court merely announced that, "It would be an idle form to direct an annuity to be
purchased, which the annuitants might sell immediately afterwards." 16
The result obtaining when the restriction on the power of alienation
is accompanied by a limitation over, hinted at in Woodmeston v.
Walker,17 was given effect in Hatton v. May 18 in 1876. There the
testator directed his trustees to purchase a government annuity with
funds from his residuary estate for a legatee who was not to be entitled
to receive the price of the annuity in lieu of the payment. The will
further directed that if the legatee should attempt any act of alienation
the annuity should cease and be void and sink into the residue. The
court refused the legatee's petition for an order requiring the trustees
to pay her the principal sum, and directed that the annuity should be
purchased and held by the trustees for her benefit until she should attempt to alienate her interest. The court distinguished Barnes v.
Rowley 19 and Bayley v. Bishop 20 on the grounds that in those cases
the interest had vested absolutely at the time of the testator's death in
that there was no limitation over specified in the event of an attempt
13 2 Russ. & M. 197, 39 Eng. Rep. 370 (1831).
14 Woodmeston v. Walker, supra note 3.
15 Re Browne's Will, supra note 3.
16 Stokes v. Cheek, supra note 3, 54 Eng. Rep. at 505.
1T 2 Russ. & M. 197, 39 Eng. Rep. 370 (1831).
IS 3 Ch. D. 148 (1876).

19 See note 6 supra.
20 See note 8 sura.
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to secure the principal sum or to alienate the interest given. However,
the court also stated that without the express provision in the will that
the annuity should cease and fall into the residue, the rule of Woodmeston v. Walker would be applicable. Thus the testator's intent,
when expressed only by a direction that no right of election was to be
bad, would still be disregarded.
In the Hatton case, the court founded its decision on an earlier
case 21 where a will contained a provision squarely in point. In this
early authority, the limitation over, a direction that the annuity was
to fall into the residue upon an attempted alienation, was given effect
when the annuitant listed the annuity among his assets in invoking the
insolvency act. But one year after the decision in Hatton v. May the
same type of will provision was held to be ineffective to avoid a transfer by the annuitant who was, the court said, entitled to the principal
sum if he so wished and was capable of giving his purchaser a good
title. Although counsel for the executors cited the decision of Hatton
v. May, the court disregarded it entirely in its opinion, merely reciting
that none of the cases cited had any bearing on the question presented. 22 Thus the decisions on this point are in apparent conflict.
However, it is interesting to note that the English courts remained
adamant on the principal rule of permitting an election wherever conceivably possible.
The further problem of whether or not the personal representative
of an annuitant may elect to take the principal amount, when the
fund from which the purchase was to be made has not yet come into
existence, was raised in In re Mabbett.2

3

The case was the more

interesting because, of the several annuitants named in the will, one
died before and one after the sale of realty out of which the fund arose.
The personal representatives of each sued for the principal sums and
the court granted the petition of the latter, but denied that of the
former. The reason advanced was that the fund out of which the
annuities were to be purchased had not yet come into existence at the
time of the first annuitant's death. The court held there could be no
vested interest in the annuity to be purchased which would permit a
payment of the principal sum into the estate. But the estate of the
annuitant who died after the inception of the fund was benefited by
the specified capital sum under the general rule. Although in earlier
and heretofore controlling cases 24 the same factor was treated as inconsequential, the court proceeded to make the distinction between the
existence and non existence of the fund and predicate its decision upon
it.
Shee v. Hale, 13 Ves. Jun. 404, 33 Eng. Rep. 346 (1807).
Hunt-Foulston v. Furber, 3 Ch. D. 285 (1876).
23 (1891] 1 Ch. 707.
24 Bayley v. Bishop, supra note 8; Barnes v. Rowley, supra note 6;
Yates v. Compton, supra note 2.
21

22
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That the general rule that a bequest directing the purchase of an
annuity may be treated as an absolute bequest of the principal amount
at the option of the legatee continues in force and without question is
well illustrated in several cases decided in the first decade of this century. 25 The English doctrine, unlike the trend in the American cases
to be discussed hereafter, has remained unchanged. The reason advanced for the application of this rule-that the legatee could immediately sell the annuity and obtain the principal amount anyway-likewise remained unchanged.
II.
The American Decisions
It was not until early in the 19th century that, the American courts
were first faced with the problem of allowing a legatee to take the principal sum set aside to purchase an annuity by direction of a will. In
1907, a New York Supreme court held that an absolute gift of $15,000
for the purchase of an annuity by the executor was merely a transferable legacy and the beneficiary could elect to take the principal sum
in lieu of the annuity payments. 26 The court's argument followed the
familiar pattern of the English courts that to deny the right of election
was a nugatory act since the beneficiary could sell or assign the annuity immediately in any event. Of material influence in the court's
decision was the absence of any remainderman whose rights might have
been affected by such election.
Four years later the first state court of last resort ruled on the matter. In this case, Parker et al. v. Cobe,27 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts granted the beneficiary of an annuity the right of election where the annuity was to be purchased by the executor. The court
said: 28
It is the settled law of England that a bequest of money to be
used in the purchase of an annuity gives the legatee a right to the
money and -he can insist that the annuity shall not be bought.

As in the English cases, emphasis was laid on the fact that the annuity
was not to be paid out of the estate but rather was to be purchased by
the executor.
Following this trend the New York Court of Appeals in 1916 gave
support to these earlier cases by declaring that the English rule governed when there was a direction to purchase and no gift over of any
25 In re Cottrell, [1910) 1 Ch. 402; In re Brunning, [19092 1 Ch. 276
(1908); In re Robbins, supra note 12.
26 Reid v. Brown, 54 Misc. 481, 106 N. Y. Supp. 27 (1907).
27 208 Mass. 260, 94 N. E. 476 (1911).
28 Id., 94 N. E. at 476.
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right under the annuity.29 The court was presented with a strong
argument that to give such a right of election was contrary to the intent
of the testator. But in disposing of this argument the court stated: 30
The counsel for the appellant strenuously insists that the right of
election claimed by the petitioner thwarts the clearly expressed intention
of the testator. I think not. It must be assumed that the will of the
testator providing for the annuity was drawn with -regard to the
law existing on the subject. The testator knew, it must be assumed,
that the gift of the annuity might be regarded as a legacy of the definite
sum set aside to purchase the annuity. If he had desired to defeat
this power of election, he should have followed the suggestion contained in Reid v. Brown . . . and placed the $10,000 in trust for the
benefit of the annuitant.

Thus the Cole case exemplified the holdings in these first American
cases. Following what the courts deemed to be the settled English rule
they steadfastly refused to deny legatees the right of election where
there was no gift over after the lifetime of the annuitant and the
annuity was to be purchased by an executor or trustee.
In 1931, a New York Surrogate's Court 31 refused to grant an election to decedent's husband where the will provided for an annuity to
be paid out of her estate during the lifetime of the husband and after
his death the principal to go to named nieces and nephews. The court
distinguished the case from In re Cole in that here the income was to
be paid out of the estate (rather than to purchase an annuity) and because there was a gift over to the nieces and nephews. And in In re
Mitchell's Estate,32 the court held that while the ruling of the Oakley
case was correct, nevertheless it applied to that particular factual situation only, and that the basic rule regarding proposed elections had
been laid down in Reid v. Brown.33
This pattern of cases in New York was followed to the extreme limit
in In re Bertuck's Estate where the Appellate Division 34 reversed a
Surrogate Court decision a5 which had given effect to the testator's
mandatory order prohibiting an election to take the principal sum of
the annuity given his wife under the will. Here the court directly and
specifically overrode the testator's express intention to give effect to
the doctrine of election. Perhaps as a result of this extreme position
the New York legislature met the problem by passing a statute in
1936 36 denying the right of the annuitant to elect to take the principal
29
30

31
32
33
34
3r
36

person

In re Cole's Estate, 219 N. Y. 435, 114 N. E. 785 (1916).
Id., 114 N. E. at 786.
In re Oakley's Will, 142 Misc. 1, 254 N. Y. Supp. 306 (1931).
152 Misc. 228, 273 N. Y. Supp. 289 (1934).
See note 26 supra.
225 App. Div. 773, 232 N. Y. Supp. 36 (1928).
In re Bertuch's Will, 132 Misc. 731, 230 N. Y. Supp. 789 (1928).
N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 47(b) which provides in part: "If a
hereafter dying shall direct in his will the purchase of an annuity from
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sum except to the extent that the will provided for such a right or to
the extent it provided an assignable annuity be purchased. However,
five years later the court in In re Fischer's Estate 37 construed this
statute to be applicable only where the testator directed the annuity
to be purchased from a particwlar insurance company. In that case
the will simply provided for the purchase of an annuity "from some
reputable life insurance company, bank or other organization authorized to issue same," and the court held that this indefiniteness carried
the case out of the statute. However, in the same year the language
of the statute was amended in such a way as to forestall such a construction.3 8 Therefore the common law rule as laid down by the courts
of New York was effectively changed by statute to give effect to the
testator's intention.
Highlighting the litigation of this problem have been the so-called
"charitable annuity company cases." The probem posed by these cases
is this: the testator wishes to provide for a certain person during his
or her lifetime, giving them an income from an annuity, and through
the purchase of this annuity from a charitable organization to make
a donation to that organization. The rates of these charitable annuities are set higher than the corresponding rates in commercial companies with the avowed purpose of having the unexpended portion of the
policy remain with the charity as a gift. In the case of In re Gels'
Estate 39 the testator had been engaged for many years in the service
of a missionary society. He wished to provide for the future security
of his wife and three children and still make a charitable gift over to
the society in whose service he had spent many years. H6 therefore
made a will directing that the estate, after the payment of his debts
and certain small legacies, be divided into four parts and- used for the
purchase of annuities from this society. In denying the annuitants
the right to elect to take the capital sum instead of the annuity payments the court said: 40
This annuitant is not now in position to demand the whole initial
sum, because the testator did not intend this legatee should receive the
whole; but did intend that the probable residue should be given over
to the charitable or benevolent purpose to which he had devoted all his

life's work.
an insurance company, the person or persons to whom the income thereof
shall be directed to be paid shall not have the right to elect to take the
capital sum directed to be used for such purchase in lieu of such annuity
except to the extent the will expressly provides for such right, or except to
the extent that the will expressly provides that an assignable annuity be purchased ...."
37 261 App. Div. 252, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 140 (1941).
88 See note 11 supra. In 1941, the statute was amended to delete the
words: . . .from an insurance company ... "
39 167 Misc. 357, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 770 (1938).
40 Id., 3 N. Y. S. (2d) at 772.
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When the problem arose in Iowa in 1947, the court in In re Johnson's Estate 41 held that the legatee had no right to take the principal
sum when it was the testator's intention to ultimately benefit the charitable society issuing the annuity--the remainderman implicit in such a
policy. In reviewing the cases upholding the English rule the court
was unimpressed with the arguments advanced in its support and impliedly indicated that it would refuse to follow the English rule whether
or not a charitable remainderman was involved.
Again that year an Illinois appellate court 42 denied the right of a
legatee of a charitable annuity the right to elect the amount to be used
to purchase the annuity. The Illinois court indicated that the testator,
by her familiarity with the purposes and rate schedule of the quasireligious society, knew and intended that the organization should be
benefited by the unexpended portion of the annuity not enjoyed by the
annuitant, and that since there was impliedly-if not expressly-a gift
over to this society, it would be contrary to the testator's intention to
permit an election.
Thus in all of these cases where the annuity was purchased from a
charitable, as opposed to a commercial insurance company, the courts
have been willing and anxious to protect and implement the intention
of the testator. It would be anomalous to speak piously of the testator's intention in these cases and yet in other cases, where by the very
use of the annuity the testator's intention to deny the beneficiary the
principal sum is apparent, to completely ignore that intention. That this
has been done, however, is evident.
Illustrative of the decisions hedging on the basic issue is the California case of In re Benziger's Estate.43 Here, too, there was a charitable society as remainderman expressly so designated. The court refused to give one of the testator's two children the right to elect, basing
its opinion on the fact that under the English rule the right of election
did not arise whenever there was a gift over. The court specifically
stated that it did not decide whether it would give effect to the testator's
intention if there was not such a gift over. The manifest intent of the
testator should be equally apparent in either case and to impliedly recognize such a distinction is judicial sophistry at its worst.
Other courts have, however, not been so reluctant to meet the problem squarely. In 1943 a New Jersey court 44 refused to adopt the
rule so strenuously contended for in the New York and Massachusetts
cases and denied the testator's wife an election. In this case there was
a specific provision in the will denying the wife any right to elect,
In re Johnson's Estate, 238 Iowa 1221, 30 N. W. (2d) 164 (1947).
In re Herrick's Estate, 340 Ill. App. 548, 92 N. E. (2d) 332 (1950).
4S 61 Cal. App. (2d) 628, 143 P. (2d) 717 (1943).
44 Berry v. President and Directors of Bank of Manhattan Co., 133 N. J.
Eq. 164, 31 A. (2d) 203 (1943).
41

42
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and the court gave effect to this intention of the testator to devise his
property subject to certain conditions. The opinion emphasized the
importance of following the testator's intention no matter how harsh
or unfair it may seem, unless that intention provides for the doing of
an illegal act or one which contravenes public policy.
The Colorado court in 1948 45 reviewed the authorities on this particular problem in a case in which the testator's estate was put in trust
until the beneficiary reached the age of fifty, at which time the trustees were to purchase an annuity for the benefit of the cestui with a
,right in the cestui to appoint any remaining payments at his death.
While there was a gift over here to remaindermen-at least contingently-the Colorado court did not decide the case on that basis, but in a
cogent and perceptive review of the authorities held that no right of
election resided in the legatee-that to permit such a right would be
contrary to the testator's express intention.
Two recent cases, however, involved the' exact problem with which
we are concerned, i. e., where there is no gift over to any remainderman,
either express or implied, and the annuities are to be purchased by the
executor. The New Hampshire court in Bedell v. Colby et al.46 refused to permit the legatee under a will to take the principal sum that
the testator had directed to be used to purchase an annuity. The court
held that it was the testator's obvious purpose to protect his daughter
from her own improvidence in money matters and for that very reason
had provided in his will for the purchase of the annuity. To permit
her now to disavow this protection and take the capital amount would
be to ignore the testator's wishes in the disposition of his estate and
the plans for his daughter's security.
In Feiler et al. v. Klein et al.,4 7 the testatrix left land in trust for
the benefit of her children. The income from the trust was to be distributed to the children, but the trustee was empowered to sell the property if he thought best and to apply the proceeds in purchasing annuities from named insurance companies. The children claimed that the
provision was capricious and demanded a right to elect to take the parcels of land. Judge Morgan dismissed this contention saying: "No
good reason is shown by the petition or evidence for failing or refusing
to carry out the wishes of the testatrix in the manner provided for in
her will." 48 The court indicated that the testatrix apparently did not
wish the devisees to have the property all at once, but rather intended
for them to be provided for over a period of years, and that for the
45

(1948).

Ketcham v. International Trust Co., 117 Colo. 559, 192 P. (2d) 426

94 N. H. 384, 54 A.
74 N. E. (2d) 384
Feiler et al., 149 Ohio St. 17,
48 Id., 74 N. E. (2d)
46
47

(2d) 161 (1947).
(Ohio App. 1947), aff'd sub nom. Feiler et al. v.
77 N. E. (2d) 237 (1948).
at 389.
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court to disregard this intention would be to ignore the settled law of
Ohio: that the testator's intention will be given effect unless the wishes
49
are illegal or contrary to public policy.

As may be seen from this examination of the cases, a definite swing
away from the arbitrary English rule has been noticeable in recent years.
The modern cases continue to place more and more importance on following out the testator's intention in this matter. It has been pointed
out 50 that the English courts in giving this right of election were influenced by the rule that where a will directs the sale of land and payment of the proceeds to a legatee, the latter may elect to take the land
instead. The basis for this rule is that it would be vain to insist on
such a sale when the legatee could purchase the land and then receive
the price back as a bequest. As was pointed out by the Court of
Appeals in Feiler et al. v. Klein et al.: 51
It is not true that the legatee by the sale will be able to receive
substantially the amount of the purchase price of the annuity.
It is our information that the vast majority of annuities -have no
cash value whatever and no value can be realized from them other
than the guaranteed monthly income once they are made effective.
If the provisions of an annuity permit its sale, such a sale is extremely
rare and it can be made, if at all, only at a heavy discount.
Hence the reasons for the English rule do not exist with regard to
modern American annuities. As this has become apparent more and
more states adopt what may be called the "modem American rule."
Conmchsion
From the summary of the English cases it would seem that the doctrine was originally premised on a different type of annuity--one which
was more or less freely assignable-a difference which the earlier American cases failed to detect. Thus the American courts in predicating
their earlier decisions on a false view of the purpose and nature of
annuities have permitted the express intention of the testator to be
thwarted. The modem cases have noticed that these arguments are
baseless and as a result there has been a gradual but definite trend
away from permitting the beneficiary to dispense with the conditions
the testator has imposed upon the acceptance of his legacy. As the
New Jersey court in a recent case remarked: 52
It is equally difficult to perceive the considerations of policy which
are said to prevent a testator from exercising his judgment and discre49

See Union Savings Bank & Trust Co. et al. v. Alter et al., 103 Ohio

St. 188, 132 N. E. 834 (1921).
50 See Note, 41 MIcH. L. Rxv. 276 (1942), for an interesting analysis of

the problem.
51 Supra note 47, 74 N. E. (2d) at 388.
52 Speth v. Speth et al., 8 N. J. Super. 587, 74 A. (2d) 344 (1950).

